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ROLE IN THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS 
WM. GRAYSON LAMBERT† 
ABSTRACT 
  The five Supreme Court nominations between 2005 and 2010 
brought renewed attention to the Senate’s role in the confirmation 
process. This Note explores the debate over the Senate’s proper role in 
that process. First, this Note summarizes and clarifies the two 
traditional views of the Senate’s role, classifying them as the “assertive 
view” and the “deferential view,” and offers a new framework for 
understanding these views. This Note then traces the traditional 
arguments made by proponents of these views. It first examines the 
historical arguments, both from original understanding and historical 
practice; it then turns to pragmatic arguments about which view better 
accomplishes the purposes of the Senate’s participation in the 
confirmation process. Neither the historical arguments nor the 
pragmatic arguments resolve the issue of which approach to the 
confirmation process is better. 
  By recounting these arguments, however, this Note reveals the 
underlying—and unspoken—difference between adherents of the 
assertive view and adherents of the deferential view: their conceptions 
of the relationship between law and politics differ widely. Adherents 
of the assertive view can fall on either end of a spectrum in 
understanding the relationship between law and politics. For some 
adherents of the assertive view, law is completely distinct from 
politics, so they believe senators should carefully ensure that judicial 
nominees understand this distinction and should vote only for those 
nominees who do and will respect it. For other adherents of the 
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assertive view, law and politics are two sides of the same coin, so they 
think senators should aggressively inquire into the views of judicial 
nominees and should vote only for those nominees whose views 
comport with their own. Either way, the assertive view results in the 
same role for the Senate in the confirmation process. Adherents of the 
deferential view, by contrast, fall somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum, believing that law is underdetermined and is shaped, but 
not totally controlled, by politics. Adherents of this view make certain 
that nominees have reasonable legal views, but they are more willing 
to vote to confirm nominees whose views differ from their own. This 
Note brings this important difference to the forefront in hopes of 
promoting more meaningful discussions about the Senate’s role in the 
confirmation process. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 20, 2010, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted 13 to 6 
to send President Obama’s nomination of Elena Kagan to serve as an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States to the 
full Senate with its favorable recommendation.1 During the 
committee’s meeting before the vote, Senator Lindsey Graham 
stated, “I could give you a hundred reasons why I could vote no if I 
based . . . my vote on how she disagrees with me.”2 Senator Graham 
clarified, however, that he based his vote not on whether he agreed 
with Kagan’s views but rather on whether he believed she was 
qualified for the federal bench and situated in the mainstream of 
American legal thought in her views.3 He quoted Senator Phil 
Gramm’s statement from the confirmation of Justice Breyer: “I am 
going to vote for this nominee, not because I agree with him 
philosophically but because I believe he is qualified. I believe he is 
credible. I believe his views, though they are different from mine, are 
within the mainstream of . . . thinking of his political party.”4 
Believing that Kagan fit this description and would “serve this nation 
 
 1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Panel Backs Kagan Nomination, with One Republican 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at A11. 
 2. Executive Business Meeting on Nominations, S. 2925, and S. 3397 of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e54768
62f735da1604cd7. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. (omission in original) (quoting 140 CONG. REC. 18,672 (1994) (statement of Sen. 
Gramm)). 
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honorably,”5 Senator Graham supported Kagan’s nomination. Every 
other Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, voted 
against recommending Kagan favorably to the full Senate because 
they disagreed with how they believed she would decide cases as a 
Justice.6 
The flurry of Supreme Court nominations between 2005 and 
2010 brought national attention to the Senate’s role in the 
confirmation process7 and, as a result, to the meaning of the 
Constitution’s Advice and Consent Clause,8 which requires the 
president to appoint federal judges “by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate.”9 Debates over the proper role of the Senate 
in the confirmation process are not new,10 and this attention reflected 
only another incarnation of a long-running battle.11 Traditional 
arguments over the Senate’s role in the confirmation process first 
focus on the history of the process.12 Yet the original understanding of 
the Advice and Consent Clause and subsequent historical practice 
provide no clear instruction for how the Senate should evaluate the 
president’s judicial nominees. Thus, the debate typically turns to 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Stolberg, supra note 1 (discussing senators’ reactions to Kagan’s nomination). 
 7. See, e.g., The Samuel Alito Nomination, PBS NEWSHOUR, http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/law/supreme_court/alito (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (providing a list of stories 
covering the Alito confirmation hearings); see also BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: 
PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 3 (updated ed. 2009) (“Nominations to 
the high court today represent major political confrontations, grand mobilizations of the 
political bases of both parties, along with their affiliated interest groups and sympathetic 
academics.”). The media, interest groups, and the public all focus on the Senate confirmation 
process. See, e.g., JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 4–
5 (1995) (discussing the increased involvement of interest groups in the confirmation process). 
As part of this attention, scholars debate whether the Court shapes society or society shapes the 
Court. Compare Neil S. Siegel, A Coase Theorem for Constitutional Theory, 2010 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 583, 588 (arguing that the Supreme Court has the power to “shape[] popular values to a 
nontrivial extent”), with BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION 
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
371 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court has generally tracked public opinion). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A 
HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II (5th 
new & rev. ed. 2008) (tracing the history of Supreme Court nominations). 
 11. No agreed-upon standard exists for determining the Senate’s role in the confirmation 
process. See David M. O’Brien, Background Paper, in JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 13, 76 (1988) (noting the 
debate over the Senate’s proper role in the confirmation process). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
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pragmatic arguments about which approach best achieves the 
purposes of the Senate’s involvement in the confirmation process.13 
But like the historical arguments, these purposive arguments shed 
little light on the proper role for the Senate. 
This Note seeks to reframe the debate over the Senate’s role in 
the confirmation process to focus on the real issue that divides 
commentators and senators: What is the relationship between law and 
politics,14 and how does that relationship inform the Senate’s role in 
the confirmation process? In Part I, this Note proffers a new 
conception of the two major approaches that senators take in 
evaluating judicial nominees. Part I.A describes what this Note terms 
the “assertive view.” Adherents of this view focus explicitly and 
specifically on a nominee’s ideology, voting to confirm only those 
nominees whose ideological views fall within a certain narrow range.15 
Then, Part I.B examines what this Note calls the “deferential view.” 
Adherents of this view argue that the Senate should be more 
deferential to the president’s nominee and should confirm any 
nominee who falls within a broadly defined “mainstream” of political 
and judicial thinking.16 
Subsequent Parts evaluate the common arguments in favor of 
these opposing views. In Part II, this Note traces the traditional 
disputes between proponents of the assertive view and proponents of 
the deferential view concerning the Senate’s historical role in the 
 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. “Politics” can be an amorphous term. In this Note, “politics” is defined as the process 
of decisionmaking in a country, both within formal settings and throughout the nation as the 
public engages in collective decisionmaking. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT, at 330–49 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (discussing the 
creation of political society). 
 15. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary) (stating that he would “inquire into how [Sotomayor’s] philosophy . . . affects [her] 
decision-making”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary) (declaring his intention to question Alito on the independence of his views from 
those of President George W. Bush); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. 
Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15–18 (2005) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Member, S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary) (comparing his views of the adaptability of the Constitution to those of 
Roberts to suggest that Roberts’s ideological views deserved especially careful scrutiny during 
the hearings). 
 16. See supra text accompanying notes 3–5. 
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confirmation process. Part II demonstrates that the original 
understanding of the Advice and Consent Clause and the history of 
the confirmation process do not resolve the debate over what the 
Senate’s role should be. Next, Part III evaluates the pragmatic 
arguments about whether the assertive view or the deferential view 
better vindicates the values implicated in the confirmation process—
including judicial independence, judicial accountability, respect for 
the rule of law, the need for qualified judges, and social cohesion. 
Part III concludes that these arguments likewise fail to resolve the 
question of which view is better. 
With the shortcomings of these traditional arguments exposed, 
Part IV sets forth the underlying source of the disagreement between 
proponents of the assertive and deferential views: a dispute about the 
relationship between law and politics. This disagreement leads to 
dramatically different conclusions about the proper role of the Senate 
in the confirmation process. After all, if law and politics are totally 
distinct, then nominees—once they become judges—must decide 
cases using only traditional tools of judicial decisionmaking, not by 
reference to their ideological beliefs. Alternatively, if law and politics 
are the same thing by different names, then judicial decisions will be 
based solely on judges’ ideological beliefs. But if the truth lies 
somewhere in between these extremes—if law and politics are to 
some degree intertwined—then judges’ decisions will be influenced 
by both their ideological views and traditional tools of judicial 
decisionmaking. If this underlying disagreement is understood, 
senators and scholars can more productively debate the Senate’s role 
rather than dwelling on issues that are merely incidental to their real 
difference of opinion.17 
 
 17. Although the deferential view may hold the most promise for a respectful, successful 
confirmation process, this Note does not seek to resolve the matter. Rather, this Note exposes 
the shortcomings of the current literature on the confirmation process in the hopes of spurring 
meaningful discussion. Furthermore, this Note also recognizes that the participants in the 
confirmation process must consider more than just their views of the relationship between law 
and politics. Political considerations and the relationships between the participants in the 
process affect confirmations and shape the Senate’s role. The real world is full of moving parts, 
but many debates over the Senate’s role focus not on these realpolitik considerations but rather 
on what the Senate’s role should be. This Note focuses on this latter discussion, clarifying the 
underlying disagreement in the debate. Although academic debates might lack the drama of 
horse-race politics, these academic dialogues shape the ideas of the next generation. Ultimately, 
this debate might not have a “right” answer that would require senators to adhere to one view 
over the other. This Note merely seeks to provide a framework for more useful debates about 
the Senate’s role. 
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I.  TWO MODELS OF THE SENATE’S ROLE IN THE CONFIRMATION 
PROCESS 
This Part proposes a new framework for defining and discussing 
the Senate’s role in the confirmation process by casting the common 
approaches to the confirmation process into two models. The first 
model is the assertive view, under which senators take a very 
aggressive approach to questioning nominees and focus intensely on 
nominees’ ideological views. Two very different views of law and 
politics can justify this view: the complete-distinction justification and 
the no-distinction justification. Although supporters of these 
variations start from radically different conceptions of the 
relationship between law and politics, they end up with a similar view 
of the Senate’s role in the confirmation process. The second model is 
the deferential view, under which senators look only to see if the 
nominee’s ideological views are within the mainstream. Senators who 
adhere to the assertive view and senators who adhere to the 
deferential view agree on two important requirements for all judicial 
nominees: top qualifications18 and good character.19 What they 
disagree on is the role that a nominee’s ideological preferences should 
play in the confirmation process. 
A. The Assertive View 
As noted, under the assertive view, senators focus intensely on a 
nominee’s ideological views. This focus on ideological orientation can 
be rooted in either of two opposite views of the relationship between 
law and politics. This Section discusses these two justifications for the 
assertive view. The first justification is that law and politics are 
completely distinct; the second is that law is just another form of 
politics, so they are not distinct at all. The first justification is far more 
 
 18. See, e.g., Lindsey Graham, The Right Vote for Me and, I Believe, the Country, LINDSEY 
GRAHAM (July 28, 2009), http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=About
SenatorGraham.Blog&ContentRecord_id=c2176c09-802a-23ad-4313-608b29022a59 (declaring 
support for Sotomayor because she, like prior nominees Roberts and Alito, had strong 
professional qualifications); ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 246–47 (noting that Lewis Powell had 
little experience as a judge or academic prior to his nomination but received widespread support 
due to his success as a former president of the American Bar Association); infra note 29. 
 19. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (2009), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf 
(setting forth the ethical rules for federal judges). This requirement of good character can also 
be viewed as connected to the Constitution’s requirement of good behavior for judges to remain 
on the bench. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour . . . .”). 
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common; the second is rarely invoked, at least by senators. Thus, this 
Note focuses more on the complete-distinction justification, though it 
also discusses the no-distinction justification to show how both 
justifications lead to a similar role for the Senate in the confirmation 
process. 
1. The Complete-Distinction Justification.  Adherents of this 
justification of the assertive view believe that the law develops totally 
independently of politics.20 Many senators adhere to this justification 
of the assertive view, claiming that the distinction between law and 
politics requires them to investigate fully whether a nominee will be 
capable of respecting that distinction as a judge.21 Yet judicial 
nominees, like all people, have personal views about the world and 
about what the law should be. Those personal views can influence 
judicial decisionmaking.22 Thus, senators who adhere to the assertive 
view want to confirm only those nominees whose views of the law 
align with the senators’ objective views of what the law is—the idea 
being that, as judges, those nominees will decide cases in accordance 
with the law and will not decide cases based on their ideological 
beliefs.23 Adherents of the assertive view, including Senators Patrick 
 
 20. See, e.g., Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast May 31, 2009) (transcript available 
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31015497/ns/meet_the_press) (providing a record of Senator 
Sessions’s comments that the law is distinct from politics). 
 21. See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31989, SUPREME COURT 
APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE 
31–33, 36 (2005) (discussing the role of ideology in the confirmation process); John C. Eastman, 
The Limited Nature of the Senate’s Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633, 652 
(2003) (“[T]he Senate today appears bent on using its limited confirmation power to impose 
ideological litmus tests on presidential nominees.”). Although scholars debate how much the 
confirmation process has changed, many seem to agree with the “unobjectionable premise that 
the judicial appointments process has become increasingly political and less genteel.” David R. 
Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1047 
(2008) (book review); see also Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Today’s Senate Confirmation Battles 
and the Role of the Federal Judiciary, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 173–74 (2003) 
(“Whatever one’s political orientation, all sides agree on one point: it is the other side that is 
‘playing politics’ with judicial nominations in an effort to exert control over the federal 
courts.”). Although slight differences may exist between how certain senators approach the 
confirmation process, this Section seeks to provide a broad sketch of how most senators think 
about the process. 
 22. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (discussing how a judge’s personal views can 
influence that judge’s decisions). 
 23. Cf. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 53 (arguing that politics is the paramount concern of 
presidents in selecting a judicial nominee and that, because many people recognize the impact 
of ideology on judicial decisions, senators will share this concern about a nominee’s ideological 
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Leahy and Jeff Sessions—both members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee24—and well-respected academics such as Professor Cass 
Sunstein, maintain that the Senate has a strong and independent role 
in the confirmation process.25 This role permits senators to question 
nominees’ ideological views very closely to ensure that, as judges, the 
nominees will base their decisions on the law rather than on their own 
ideological views.26 
Regardless of which party controls the White House and the 
Senate, the post-World War II confirmation process has been 
remarkably consistent in its use of ideology, reflecting the prevalence 
of this justification of the assertive view.27 When the president sends 
his nomination to the Senate, the prevailing presumption is that the 
president has selected a nominee with whom the president feels an 
ideological compatibility.28 Members of the president’s party in the 
Senate then typically hail the nominee as an excellent choice, whose 
temperament and experience easily qualify the nominee to sit on the 
federal bench. At the same time, senators of the opposing party 
express grave fears that the nominee is a fierce partisan and unfit for 
the bench.29 For example, Republicans praised President George W. 
Bush’s judicial nominations, particularly Supreme Court nominees 
John Roberts and Samuel Alito, whereas Democrats immediately 
 
views). A nominee’s ideological views include the nominee’s political views and philosophy, as 
well as any personal beliefs that shape the nominee’s worldview. 
 24. Committee Members, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.
senate.gov/about/members.cfm (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 25. See, e.g., David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the 
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1501 (1992) (“[There exists] an independent role for 
the Senate in the confirmation . . . process.”); supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 26. What makes this form of the assertive view challenging in practice is the fact that 
Republicans and Democrats often take conflicting views of what the law is or is constitutionally 
required to be, thereby casting doubt on the clear distinction between law and politics that this 
view claims exists. Cf. Amy Goldstein & Charles Babington, Roberts Avoids Specifics on 
Abortion Issue, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A1 (noting the different views of abortion law 
reflected by questions from Republicans and Democrats during Roberts’s confirmation 
hearing). 
 27. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 188–324 (tracing the development of the confirmation 
process since World War II). 
 28. See id. at 52–53 (noting that the president focuses on a nominee’s “real politics” in the 
nomination process); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1203 (1988) (“We take for granted that the President will nominate a 
person whose general constitutional philosophy the President endorses.”). 
 29. Cf. Elisabeth Bumiller & Carl Hulse, Bush’s Court Choice Ends Bid After Attack by 
Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A1 (demonstrating that the president’s party is 
unlikely to back a nominee who appears unqualified both because of issues with the nominee’s 
qualifications and uncertainty about how the nominee would decide cases). 
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conveyed their concerns that these nominees held extreme views and 
could not be trusted.30 Several years later, when President Obama 
announced his Supreme Court nominations of Sonia Sotomayor and 
Elena Kagan, as well as his circuit court nominations of Goodwin Liu 
and Robert Chatigny, the roles were reversed, with Democratic 
senators lauding the nominations and Republicans fervently 
proclaiming their disagreement with the president’s selections.31 
These reactions naturally follow from senators’ beliefs that their view 
of the law is correct and from concerns that a nominee who has a 
different view of the law based on different ideological beliefs will 
follow his own legal views.32 
Members of the president’s party feel comfortable stressing the 
nominee’s qualifications and the wisdom of the president’s choice 
 
 30. See, e.g., Bush Nominates Alito to Supreme Court, CNN (Oct. 31, 2005), http://articles.
cnn.com/2005-10-31/politics/scotus.bush_1_confirmation-bush-nominates-alito-hearings 
(“Conservatives lauded President Bush . . . for his choice of Judge Samuel Alito for the 
Supreme Court, while liberals signaled a contentious confirmation hearing is ahead for the 
nominee.”); Bush Picks Roberts for Supreme Court, FOXNEWS.COM (July 20, 2005), http://www.
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,163025,00.html (describing the positive reactions from Republican 
senators to the Roberts nomination and the criticism expressed by Democrats). 
 31. See, e.g., Nominations Hearing of U.S. Circuit and U.S. District Judges: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 496–97 (2010) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Republican members seem to be applying a standard 
to President Obama’s nominees that they did not demand of President Bush’s . . . . Senate 
Republicans . . . declar[ed] themselves ‘disappointed’ by the President’s nomination of Professor 
Liu and claim[ed] that Professor Liu was ‘far outside the mainstream of American 
jurisprudence.’”); Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Comments on the President’s 
Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the U.S. Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), available at 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=c351dc4a-5d99-4f20-aa07-4d991cc5a349 
(“Judge Sotomayor has a long and distinguished career on the federal bench. . . . Her record is 
exemplary.”); Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast June 28, 2010), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/video/elena-kagan-faces-confirmation-hearing-today-11031290 
(recording Senator Sessions’s statement that “[activism is] what [Kagan’s] philosophy is”). 
 32. For Senator Sessions’s comments indicating that he was “troubled” by Sotomayor’s 
views, see Meet the Press, supra note 20. If a senator believes that the law has a fixed meaning 
that judges must apply and the senator is faced with a nominee who holds different views that 
may limit the nominee’s ability to apply the law fairly, then the senator must believe that his 
own interpretation of the law is the correct one and that the interpretation held by the nominee 
is incorrect. Alternatively, these reactions could potentially be driven by political animus. Such a 
conclusion, however, is generally based on speculation, rather than outright statements to that 
effect. Compare Dan Balz, More Democrats Say They Will Oppose Alito, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 
2006, at A4 (noting Democratic senators’ stated reasons for opposing Alito’s nomination, 
including fears about Alito’s legal views), with Democrats Continue To Embarrass Themselves 
Regarding Judge Alito, ROSSPUTIN.COM (Jan. 30, 2006, 6:23 AM), http://rossputin.com/blog/
index.php/democrats_continue_to_embarrass_themselv (arguing that Democratic senators 
opposed Alito’s nomination because of “political pandering” to liberal voters). This Note takes 
senators at their word regarding their reasons for opposing judicial nominees. 
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because they trust that the president has chosen a nominee who 
generally agrees with the president and his party as to the meaning of 
the law.33 These senators also discuss the nominee’s ideology, painting 
the nominee as fitting well within the mainstream of American 
political opinion.34 Senators who oppose the nominee similarly focus 
their attacks on the nominee’s ideological views. These opponents, 
however, try to paint the nominee as extreme and likely to base his 
decisions on political rather than judicial considerations, a prospect 
that in turn means that some of those decisions could be contrary to 
established law.35 For example, Democrats alleged that Supreme 
Court nominee Samuel Alito and Eleventh Circuit nominee William 
Pryor would undermine civil rights for minorities and women.36 
Likewise, Republicans claimed that Sotomayor’s “wise Latina” 
comment showed that she harbored racial and gender prejudices and 
 
 33. See ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 146 (1971) 
(concluding that, as of 1971, presidents had succeeded in finding an ideologically compatible 
nominee about three-fourths of the time). This fraction will most likely increase, given the 
greater importance put on the screening of judicial nominees since the Reagan administration. 
See O’BRIEN, supra note 27, at 69 (noting that the Reagan administration established “the most 
rigorous process for judicial selection ever”). 
 34. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, supra 
note 15, at 4 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“My 
review of [Judge Sotomayor’s] judicial record leads me to conclude that she is a careful and 
restrained judge with a deep respect for judicial precedent and for the powers of the other 
branches of the Government, including the law-making role of Congress.”); Confirmation 
Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., supra note 15, at 1028 (statement of Sen. 
Richard G. Lugar) (“I have every confidence that Judge Roberts, in addition to the 
extraordinary intellectual, professional and personal qualities he will bring to the task of leading 
our Nation’s highest court, will also bring a profound understanding of and commitment to the 
transcendent principles . . . about the proper role of the judiciary in our constitutional system.”). 
 35. Often, members of the president’s party appear to be favoring the deferential view, 
whereas senators of the opposing party appear to follow the assertive view. See supra notes 29–
32 and accompanying text. In reality, a senator who adheres to the assertive view at any time is 
likely to be a consistent adherent of the assertive view. The senator simply sees the need to be 
more assertive when the nominee holds different views than the senator does, and the senator 
has less need to be so assertive when the nomination is made by a president of that senator’s 
party because the president would presumably have already screened the nominee. See 
ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 52 (“Among the points a president is almost certain to consider 
[includes] . . . whether the nominee has been a loyal member of the president’s party . . . .”). 
 36. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Barbara Boxer, Democratic Women Senators United 
in Opposition to the Nomination of Judge Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 31, 2006), 
available at http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/013106.cfm (providing statements from 
female Democratic senators describing Alito as biased against the rights of women); James 
Rowley, William Pryor Confirmed by U.S. Senate to Appeals-Court Seat, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 
2005, 4:30 PM EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awAIx
BHXqL1M (noting the objections from Democrats that Pryor had opposed civil rights earlier in 
his career and lacked the appropriate temperament for the federal bench). 
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that Kagan’s restrictions on military recruiters at Harvard Law School 
demonstrated her bias against the military.37 
Ultimately, hearings and confirmation votes for the most high-
profile nominations generally fall along partisan lines.38 These votes 
capture the assertive view of advice and consent: a senator votes for a 
nominee only if the senator believes the nominee holds ideological 
views that align with the senator’s views about what the law is. 
2. The No-Distinction Justification.  The second justification, 
grounded in legal realism,39 is based on the view that law is merely 
another form of politics. Under this approach, because the law is the 
means for achieving political results, a senator votes in favor of only 
those nominees whose ideological views align with his own, believing 
that those nominees’ rulings as judges will develop the law in a way 
that the senator favors. 
Although this justification has some support among academics,40 
senators typically do not invoke it. Senators may rely on the 
 
 37. E.g., David M. Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, Parties Plot Strategy as Sotomayor Visits 
Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009, at A20 (noting that Republican senators sought to use 
Sotomayor’s comments about a “wise Latina” being a better judge as evidence of her prejudicial 
views); Bernie Becker, Alexander a No on Kagan, N.Y. TIMES THE CAUCUS BLOG (July 23, 
2010, 1:39 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/alexander-a-no-on-kagan (stating 
that Senator Lamar Alexander planned to vote against Kagan’s nomination because of “his 
concern over her decision to ban military recruiters from parts of the campus while she was 
dean of Harvard Law School”). 
 38. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. 361 (2006) (recording the Senate’s roll-call vote on Alito’s 
Supreme Court nomination, in which fifty-four of fifty-five Republican senators voted in favor 
of confirmation and forty-one of the forty-five senators who caucused with the Democrats voted 
against confirmation). Of course, vote counts might reflect a genuine disagreement among 
senators even if all senators adhered to the deferential view, so vote counts are not necessarily 
accurate indicia of the assertive view in action. Nominations that receive less attention often do 
not generate bitter partisan fights, presumably because fighting over such nominees is not worth 
the political capital of senators who might potentially oppose those nominees. Cf. LEE EPSTEIN 
& JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 92 
(2005) (“No more than one out of every five nominations to the lower courts over the last five 
decades has generated objections of any type . . . .”). Nevertheless, when votes regularly fall 
along party lines, those votes suggest that senators are supporting only nominees with whom 
they agree ideologically. 
 39. For a foundational text of what became the legal-realist school of thought, see Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 40. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 38, at 3 (arguing that senators should care 
about a nominee’s ideological views because judges are political and their personal views shape 
the law). Other academics, of course, strongly disagree. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Essay, The 
President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors 
Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 665 (1993) (noting with disfavor the idea that judges 
LAMBERT IN PRINTER PROOF (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2012  3:16 PM 
1294 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1283 
complete-distinction justification instead either because they 
genuinely believe that the justification is correct or because they 
believe that doing so is a political necessity.41 This Note takes senators 
at their word about why they adhere to the assertive view. 
Nevertheless, this Note includes the no-distinction justification 
because doing so gives a more complete description of the debate 
over the Senate’s role in the confirmation process. 
B. The Deferential View 
Under the deferential view, senators look only to whether a 
nominee’s views fall within a broad mainstream. In the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries, the deferential view has not been as 
prominent as the assertive view, but it retains some influence.42 
During the confirmation hearings for Kagan and Sotomayor, Senator 
Graham was the deferential view’s most ardent proponent and drew 
widespread attention for his approach to the Senate’s role in the 
confirmation process.43 During the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
debate over whether to send Kagan’s nomination to the full Senate, 
 
“mak[e] policy on a set of discrete issues rather than applying a coherent body of legal theory to 
all cases”). 
 41. Given the “increasingly partisan” atmosphere of the confirmation process, WITTES, 
supra note 7, at 5, and how “the [informal] rules have fundamentally changed” so that that most 
members of the opposing party automatically object to a nominee, id. at x, reason may exist to 
doubt these statements from senators. Regardless, the two justifications of the assertive view 
lead to similar roles for the Senate in the confirmation process, and the underlying debate over 
the Senate’s role can be clarified without knowing senators’ true motivations. 
 42. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. 18,667–69 (1994) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) 
(describing his deference to President Clinton’s nomination of Stephen Breyer because Breyer 
was qualified to sit on the Supreme Court and was within the mainstream in his thinking); see 
also, Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 135–36 (1994) 
(statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that, 
although he did “not agree with Judge Breyer on every issue,” Senator Thurmond would still 
support Breyer’s nomination because Breyer had a strong resume and had the “proper judicial 
temperament”). This view was also influential among the “Gang of 14” in 2005. See Senators 
Compromise on Filibusters, CNN (May 24, 2005, 12:20 AM EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2005/
POLITICS/05/23/filibuster.fight (describing the compromise reached by the Gang of 14). 
 43. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Op-Ed., Standing Tall Against the Purity Police, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 14, 2010, at A17 (noting that Senator Graham broke with his party on judicial nominations 
as well as on other issues); Jay Newton-Small, Lindsey Graham: New GOP Maverick in the 
Senate, TIME (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1949766,00.html 
(discussing Senator Graham’s “reputation as an independent dealmaker” and his vote for 
Sotomayor). See generally Robert Draper, This Year’s Maverick, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 4, 
2010, at 22 (describing Senator Graham as willing to work with both Republicans and 
Democrats to build consensus on various issues). 
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Senator Graham described his view of advice and consent.44 His 
similar statements about voting in favor of Sotomayor’s 
confirmation45 reflected earlier articulations of the approach. 
In calling for the Senate to return to the “Qualification 
Standard” that Senator Graham said the Senate had used for most of 
its history,46 Senator Graham’s statement set out three considerations 
for analyzing judicial nominees: qualifications, character, and 
ideological views.47 These factors featured in earlier articulations of 
the deferential view, such as the views of Senators John Warner48 and 
Charles Mathias.49 When analyzing these considerations, adherents of 
the deferential view argue that senators should give the president’s 
choice a presumption of confirmability because “the 
Constitution . . . puts a requirement on [senators] to not replace 
[their] judgment for [the president’s].”50 This deference means that 
votes against a nominee should presumably be “the exception, not the 
rule”51 and that a senator should vote against a nominee only in “an 
extraordinary circumstance.”52 Under this approach, a senator votes 
for or against a nominee based not on whether the senator would 
 
 44. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 45. Graham, supra note 18. 
 46. Id. (calling for the Senate to “go back to the judicial standard for Supreme Court 
nominees which served our country well for over 200 years—the ‘Qualification Standard’”). 
 47. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2; see also Graham on Senate Confirmation of 
Judge Tim Cain, SC BUSINESS BLOG, http://scbusinessblog.com/?p=538 (last visited Feb. 14, 
2012) (quoting Senator Graham as noting that a judicial nominee who “possesse[d] a great 
combination of intellect, integrity, common sense, and judicial demeanor” ought to be 
confirmed). 
 48. See 147 CONG. REC. 14,024–25 (2001) (statement of Sen. Warner) (providing reasons 
why the Senate should confirm a circuit court nominee). 
 49. See Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States 
Senate in the Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200, 204 (1987) (citing a nominee’s 
intellect, temperament, and experience as factors to consider in evaluating a nominee). 
 50. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham, 
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also 139 CONG. REC. 18,141 (1993) (statement of Sen. 
Strom Thurmond) (stating that he would give Ruth Bader Ginsburg “the benefit of any 
doubts”). 
 51. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham 
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 52. Graham, supra note 18. Such “extraordinary circumstance[s]” might occur if the 
nominee were to be related to the president or were to attempt to bribe someone to obtain the 
appointment. Id. 
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have nominated that particular person but rather based on whether 
the nominee is a reasonable choice to sit on the federal bench.53 
Like the assertive view, the deferential view is shaped by its 
conception of the relationship between law and politics. Proponents 
of this view acknowledge the underdeterminacy of law.54 They accept 
the idea that, in a diverse society, people can hold different yet 
equally reasonable views. In elections, such differences lead people to 
cast ballots for different candidates,55 and the winner of the 
presidential election gets the power to nominate judges. The party 
that loses an election is willing to accept the nominees of the winning 
party because the losing party knows that it can win the next election 
and put its nominees on the bench, thus helping to develop the law in 
a way that the losing party prefers. 
Based on this view of the relationship between law and politics, 
Senator Graham’s analysis of a nominee’s ideological perspective 
differs from an analysis under the assertive view because Senator 
Graham is willing to confirm nominees who fit within a broad range 
of ideological views.56 The deferential view seeks to determine only if 
 
 53. See 151 CONG. REC. 26,071 (2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (stressing that 
senators must look at how a judge decides a case, not just the outcomes of decisions). 
 54. The underdeterminacy of law is the idea that the development of the law is partially 
controlled by existing legal doctrines and partially influenced by political events. Lawrence B. 
Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 
(1987). The indeterminacy of law is the idea that the development of the law is completely 
controlled by political events. Id.; cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–25 (1961) 
(discussing the “open texture” of the law in its development). The determinacy of law is the idea 
that the development of the law is unchangeably dictated by existing legal doctrines, Solum, 
supra, at 473, as if the law were handed down from on high in the same way God gave Moses the 
Ten Commandments on Mount Sinai, see Exodus 19:1–20:21. Thus, the underdeterminacy of 
law is a middle ground between these extreme positions: adherents of the deferential view do 
not believe that law and politics are synonymous, see Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 
(statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting “a 
difference between politics and the law”), nor do they believe that law and politics are totally 
unrelated, see Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, supra note 
15, at 425 (statement of Sen. Lindsay O. Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[Y]ou 
are not going to find a law book that tells you whether a fundamental right exists vis-à-vis the 
Second Amendment . . . [;] you are going to have to rely upon your view of America, who we 
are, how far we have come and where we are going to go, and our relationship to gun 
ownership.”). Rather, they believe that judges, although influenced by their beliefs, still base 
their decisions on traditional methods of legal decisionmaking. 
 55. See generally THE PARTY’S JUST BEGUN: SHAPING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR 
AMERICA’S FUTURE (Larry J. Sabato & Bruce Larson eds., 2d ed. 2009) (discussing how voters 
choose political parties and candidates based on the views and positions of those candidates and 
parties). 
 56. Compare supra notes 30–31, with supra note 4. 
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a nominee’s thinking fits within a broad range of reasonable beliefs, 
unlike the assertive view, which focuses on whether a nominee’s 
views are likely to align with a senator’s own views of the law. 
Defining what views are reasonable can be difficult. For Senator 
Graham, a nominee’s thinking falls outside this broad range of 
acceptable views when the nominee holds views that are outside of 
the mainstream of American politics.57 According to Senator Graham, 
a nominee with extreme ideological commitments is more likely to 
decide cases in a way that causes the law to develop outside of 
generally accepted American ideological views; such a nominee is 
likely to decide cases without any reliance on traditional tools of 
judicial decisionmaking.58 Likewise, Senator Gramm described 
acceptable views as those “within the mainstream of the thinking of 
[the nominee’s] political party.”59 Senator Jim Talent expressed a 
variety of this view as well, noting that no one narrow mainstream 
exists but rather that a judicial nominee can hold a wide range of 
reasonable positions.60 
Several nominations illustrate Senator Graham’s conception of 
the mainstream. For instance, although Senator Graham 
acknowledged that Sotomayor was “far more liberal than [he] would 
prefer,” he thought that she was “within the mainstream,” a fact that 
was demonstrated by her writings and opinions.61 Likewise, Senator 
Graham stated that, despite his disagreements with Kagan, she was 
also within the mainstream, even though most Senate Republicans 
disagreed.62 Senator Graham similarly believed that Alito was within 
the mainstream, even though many Democrats disagreed with 
Senator Graham’s assessment of Alito’s views.63 Ultimately, Senator 
Graham showed how broad the acceptable range could be when he 
opined that Kagan was confirmable even though she had named 
Israeli jurist Aharon Barak as her hero. Senator Graham noted his 
 
 57. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 58. See Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary) (recognizing that a judge’s views influence decisions); see also 132 
CONG. REC. 23,813 (1986) (statement of Sen. Pete V. Domenici) (stating that a nominee’s 
personal philosophy is only relevant if it “undermines the fundamental principles of our 
constitutional system” or threatens the nominee’s ability to judge impartially). 
 59. 140 CONG. REC. 18,672 (1994) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
 60. 151 CONG. REC. 7875–76 (2005) (statement of Sen. Talent). 
 61. Graham, supra note 18. 
 62. See supra note 37. 
 63. See supra note 36. 
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hope that a conservative whose hero was former judge and Professor 
Robert Bork could also be confirmed.64 
Some nominees, however, fall outside the mainstream as defined 
by Senator Graham. On the left, Senator Graham opposed Goodwin 
Liu’s nomination to the Ninth Circuit,65 and on the right, he opposed 
the nomination of William Haynes to the Fourth Circuit.66 In Senator 
Graham’s eyes, both Liu and Haynes held extreme views—Liu about 
welfare rights and Haynes about limits on executive power—that 
were not generally accepted by either political party.67 Thus, these 
nominees fell outside the mainstream, and Senator Graham did not 
support their nominations.68 
The contrast between the assertive view of the Senate’s advice-
and-consent role and the deferential view is striking. Although both 
views consider the nominee’s ideology, they do so in meaningfully 
different ways. Given these differences, each interpretation of the 
Senate’s role has very different implications for the confirmation 
process. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF ADVICE AND CONSENT 
The assertive view and the deferential view described in Part I 
have been present throughout the history of judicial confirmations. In 
arguing about which view is better, proponents of each view often 
focus on the original understanding of the Advice and Consent 
Clause and on the historical practice of the confirmation process 
rather than on the underlying disagreement about the relationship 
 
 64. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary). Barak is the former president of the Supreme Court of Israel who was 
noted for his very liberal views. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Praise for an Israeli Judge Drives 
Criticism of Kagan, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/us/politics/
25kagan.html (describing Kagan’s admiration of Barak). 
 65. See Press Release, Senator Lindsey Graham, Graham Votes Against Liu Nomination 
(May 13, 2010), available at http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=933C8744-802A-23AD-401E-1F426661C02A 
(providing Senator Graham’s reasons for opposing Liu’s nomination). 
 66. See Kate Zernike, G.O.P. Senator Resisting Bush over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
2006, at A1 (“[Senator Graham] raised questions about the judicial nomination of William J. 
Haynes II, the Pentagon general counsel who helped write a memorandum that narrowly 
defined torture only as treatment that causes pain similar to death or major organ failure.”). 
 67. See sources cited supra notes 65–66. 
 68. Of course, other senators disagreed with Senator Graham about these nominees, and 
the lack of clear standards for determining what views fall outside the mainstream makes the 
deferential view difficult in practice. 
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between law and politics. These debates over the original 
understanding and history of the Advice and Consent Clause have 
been well chronicled in many places and have been debated by 
countless scholars and senators.69 Thus, this Part does not seek to 
recount these historical arguments in their entirety. Instead, it sets out 
enough of these debates to demonstrate that compelling arguments 
exist in favor of both the assertive view and the deferential view. The 
ability of both views to find support in the historical record suggests 
that history alone cannot determine which view of advice and consent 
the Senate should adopt.70 These historical arguments do not reveal 
the underlying disagreement between the assertive view and the 
deferential view, but understanding these arguments is important for 
putting the most fundamental difference between these views in 
context and for providing enough background to appreciate that 
difference. 
A. The Original Understanding of the Advice and Consent Clause 
1. The Constitutional Convention.  The Constitutional 
Convention, for all its laborious efforts, actually left little insight into 
the Framers’ thinking about the Advice and Consent Clause. This 
short sketch of the Convention’s discussion of judicial appointments 
provides the framework for analyzing the original understanding of 
the Advice and Consent Clause. 
On May 29, 1787, Edmund Randolph introduced his fifteen-
point Virginia Plan, which called for “a National Judiciary . . . to be 
chosen by the National Legislature.”71 The Committee of the Whole 
discussed this proposal on June 5, with James Wilson noting that 
 
 69. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 10; MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 15–77 (2000); 
Mathias, supra note 49. This Note provides anecdotes from the history of the confirmation 
process to demonstrate that both the assertive view and the deferential view can find support in 
historical practice. For a brief history of how the practices and procedures of judicial 
nominations have changed, see generally RICHARD S. BETH & BETSY PALMER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33247, SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS: SENATE FLOOR PROCEDURE 
AND PRACTICE, 1789–2011 (2011). 
 70. Furthermore, some commentators and judges may not accept a historical argument as 
binding, even if that argument conclusively proves the original understanding of the debated 
text. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 5–6 (2005) (arguing that history should not necessarily be the lynchpin of legal 
argument). 
 71. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 32 
(Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1840). 
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appointment by the executive was favorable because such a system 
would charge “a single, responsible person” with the selection of 
judges.72 During that same debate, James Madison argued that the full 
legislature might not know what made good judges but that giving the 
power to one person was unwise. Thus, Madison proposed that the 
Virginia Plan’s language of “appointment by the Legislature” be 
struck and the power be given to the Senate.73 This motion was 
adopted.74 Madison defended this position on June 13,75 eventually 
convincing Roger Sherman and Charles Pinckney to withdraw their 
motion to institute appointment by the entire legislature rather than 
just the Senate.76 Soon thereafter, William Paterson presented the 
New Jersey Plan, which called for judges “to be appointed by the 
Executive.”77 A few days later, on June 18, Alexander Hamilton, in 
response to the New Jersey Plan, proposed his own plan. His proposal 
called for presidential appointment, “subject to the approbation or 
rejection of the Senate.”78 On June 19, however, the Convention 
rejected the approaches of both Hamilton’s plan and the New Jersey 
Plan, leaving the appointment power with the Senate.79 
When the Convention next discussed judicial appointments on 
July 18, Nathaniel Gorham proposed that judges be appointed by the 
president with the “advice [and] consent” of the Senate.80 Gorham 
claimed that the president would “be careful to look through all the 
States for proper characters” to appoint as judges.81 This proposal 
sparked further debate on the topic; some delegates, such as Luther 
Martin and Roger Sherman, still believed that the appointment power 
should belong to the Senate, whereas others, including Wilson, 
supported Gorham’s proposal.82 The Convention, however, did not 
 
 72. Id. at 67. 
 73. Id. at 68 (emphasis omitted). 
 74. Id. at 68–69. 
 75. Id. at 112–13 (“The [judicial] candidate who was present, who had displayed a talent for 
business in the legislative field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their 
own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means, would without any of the essential 
qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a competitor not having these 
recommendations, but possessed of every necessary accomplishment.”). 
 76. Id. at 113. 
 77. Id. at 120. 
 78. Id. at 138. 
 79. Id. at 150. 
 80. Id. at 314. 
 81. Id. at 315. 
 82. Id. at 315–17. 
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adopt Gorham’s proposal.83 The same day, the Convention also 
rejected Madison’s alternative plan, which would have given the 
president the power to appoint judges and the Senate the power to 
veto the appointment with a two-thirds vote.84 A few days later, the 
Convention referred the matter to the Committee of Detail.85 When 
the committee returned its report on August 6, the Senate still had 
the power to appoint judges.86 Then, on September 4, with virtually no 
discussion, the Convention changed course, adopting an “advice and 
consent” scheme much like the one Gorham had proposed.87 Thus the 
Constitution’s scheme of judicial appointments was born, reflecting a 
compromise between those delegates who believed the executive 
should have the sole appointment power and those delegates who 
wanted the legislature to appoint judges. 
2. Ratification Debates and the First Congresses.  As ratified in 
the Constitution, the “vaguely worded textual grant of power” to the 
Senate to advise and consent to judicial nominees gives little guidance 
as to how the Framers intended the power to be used.88 Proponents of 
both the assertive view and the deferential view can find support from 
the Constitutional Convention and the Founding era to support their 
interpretation of the proper understanding of the Advice and 
Consent Clause. 
For the assertive view, Madison’s Notes89 clearly suggest that 
many delegates were wary of giving too much power to the executive 
and consistently rejected plans to give the executive an unchecked 
power to appoint judges.90 The inclusion of the Senate in the process 
at all meant, in the words of James Gauch, that the Framers “tacitly 
 
 83. Id. at 317. 
 84. Id. at 344. 
 85. Id. at 383. 
 86. Id. at 391. 
 87. Id. at 575. 
 88. WITTES, supra note 7, at 104; see also Derek P. Langhauser, Essay, Nominations to the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Historical Lessons for Today’s Debate, 205 EDUC. L. REP. 
553, 556 (“[T]he Constitution provides little clear guidance on how the Framers intended the 
Senate to use its advice and consent powers when reviewing Supreme Court nominees.”); 
Monaghan, supra note 28, at 1205 (“The Constitution is silent on what criteria the Senate should 
use in giving ‘Advice and Consent’ . . . .”); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1498 (“This 
picture [of the Constitutional Convention] leaves something of a puzzle.”). 
 89. MADISON, supra note 71. 
 90. See id. at 67, 317 (declining to adopt James Wilson’s proposals to entrust the 
appointment power solely to the executive). 
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endorsed ideological considerations.” Gauch explains that “Equal 
state representation meant that any inclusion of the Senate [in the 
confirmation process] would necessarily involve accommodating 
different views on states’ rights, and different views on states’ rights 
represented political differences.”91 Additionally, proponents of the 
assertive view point to the fact that nothing in the Constitution 
prohibits the Senate from taking an aggressive posture in the 
process.92 
Proponents of the assertive view can also find support in the 
ratification debates: Madison seemingly acknowledged a role for the 
Senate in Federalist No. 38.93 Comments made during state ratification 
debates about the Senate’s ability to be actively involved in 
confirming judges, such as Randolph’s statements in Virginia and 
James McHenry’s comments in Maryland, also support the assertive 
view.94 
Proponents of the assertive view can further rely on actions 
taken by early Congresses as evidence supporting their view of advice 
and consent. The Senate, for example, rejected John Rutledge’s 
nomination to be Chief Justice largely because of Rutledge’s 
opposition to the Jay Treaty.95 Likewise, senators challenged 
nominees of Presidents Madison and John Quincy Adams, taking an 
aggressive role in evaluating whether the nominees should sit on the 
bench.96 These examples lead proponents of the assertive view to 
claim that the original understanding of the Advice and Consent 
Clause supports a robust role for the Senate in evaluating judicial 
 
 91. James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court 
Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 357 (1989). 
 92. E.g., WITTES, supra note 7, at 128 (“Nothing in the Constitution forbids such an 
aggressive posture, which the Senate remains free to assume at any time.”). 
 93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison); e.g., Matthew D. Marcotte, Advice and 
Consent: A Historical Argument for Substantive Senatorial Involvement in Judicial Nominations, 
5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 533–35 (2002). In Federalist No. 38, Madison responds to 
the objection that allowing the Senate to have a role in the confirmation of judges is a “vicious 
part” of the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 232 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
 94. E.g., Marcotte, supra note 93, at 533–35. 
 95. See Gauch, supra note 91, at 358–62 (discussing Rutledge’s nomination); Strauss & 
Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1500 (“The Senate ultimately rejected Rutledge for political 
reasons . . . .”). 
 96. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1501 (noting the Senate’s assertiveness in the 
nominations of Alexander Wolcott and Robert Trimble). Wolcott was rejected, and Trimble 
was confirmed after a bitter battle in the Senate. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 71–72, 75. 
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nominees.97 Thus, these proponents claim, senators should be able to 
consider a nominee’s ideological views when voting on the nominee, 
just as the president can consider those views in choosing a nominee, 
to determine if the nominee holds views that align with the senators’.98 
At the same time, the historical record also provides strong 
support for the deferential view of advice and consent. The 
Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected a prominent role for 
Congress when it refused to give both legislative houses the power to 
appoint judges,99 and the Convention likewise rejected such a role for 
the Senate when it gave the president, rather than the Senate, the 
power to nominate federal judges.100 The preeminence of the 
president’s role, proponents argue, is clear from the text of the 
Advice and Consent Clause, which gives the president the exclusive 
power to nominate judges and permits the Senate to give its consent 
only after the nominee has been sent to the Senate.101 
The ratification debates also lend support to the deferential view. 
According to Hamilton in Federalist No. 76,102 the Constitution vests 
the power to nominate judges in one person because the Framers 
believed that that structure would produce better judges,103 and the 
Constitution provides for the Senate to be a check on those 
nominations only “to prevent the appointment of unfit characters 
 
 97. See, e.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1501 (claiming that “history support[s] an 
independent role for the Senate in the confirmation process”). 
 98. Cf. Jeff Yates & William Gillespie, Essay, Supreme Court Power Play: Assessing the 
Appropriate Role of the Senate in the Confirmation Process, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1070 
(2001) (claiming that a “vigorous institutional role for the Senate” is preferable because it keeps 
the president from having too much power in selecting a nominee). 
 99. See MADISON, supra note 71, at 68 (changing the nomination power from one vested in 
the entire Congress to one vested solely in the Senate); supra notes 71–87 and accompanying 
text. 
 100. See MADISON, supra note 71, at 575 (recording the adoption of the Advice and Consent 
Clause, which vests the power to nominate judges in the executive); supra notes 72–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 101. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 194–95 
(2005) (noting the far greater power that the Constitution gives the president in the nomination 
process compared to the Senate); Eastman, supra note 21, at 640 (arguing that the president’s 
sole power to nominate suggests that the Senate’s role in the confirmation process is 
subordinate to the president’s role); McGinnis, supra note 40, at 642–43 (noting that the text of 
the Advice and Consent Clause gives much greater authority to the president than to the 
Senate). 
 102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 103. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 455 (“The sole 
and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more 
exact regard to reputation.”). 
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from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal 
attachment, or from a view to popularity.”104 Proponents of the 
deferential view also point to comments from other prominent 
national leaders, such as James Wilson, who expressed deferential 
views during the ratification debates.105 Similarly, James Iredell, the 
future Supreme Court Justice, stated during the ratification debate in 
North Carolina that “the Senate has no other influence but a restraint 
on improper appointments.”106 
The early history of the Senate’s advice-and-consent role also 
provides support for the deferential view. For instance, the rejection 
of Rutledge’s nomination was based not only on his opposition to the 
Jay Treaty but also on questions about his mental health.107 Thus, 
although Rutledge’s ideological views appear to have played a role, 
other factors were also involved,108 a fact that weakens the support the 
failed Rutledge nomination gives to the assertive view. Furthermore, 
other examples cited in support of the assertive view do not 
necessarily show that disagreement with a nominee’s ideological 
views is a sufficient ground for rejecting a nominee. Supreme Court 
nominee Alexander Wolcott, for instance, was overwhelmingly 
rejected because of “his extreme partisanship.”109 Even more powerful 
support for this view comes from the relatively easy confirmations of 
judicial nominees who had clear ideological views but who were 
nonetheless overwhelmingly approved.110 
The history of the Founding era is thus ambiguous. It reveals no 
clear original understanding of the Senate’s advice-and-consent role 
 
 104. Id. at 457. 
 105. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 21, at 646–47 (explaining Wilson’s position on the 
Senate’s narrow role in the confirmation process); Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ 
Understanding of “Advice and Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 103, 129–30 (2005) (discussing Wilson’s comments during the Pennsylvania 
ratification debates). 
 106. Eastman, supra note 21, at 646 (quoting James Iredell, Debate in North Carolina 
Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 102, 102 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)). 
 107. TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 20 
(2001); Eastman, supra note 21, at 649. 
 108. See Eastman, supra note 21, at 649 (noting that “the Senate’s refusal to confirm 
Rutledge might in part be due to questions about his mental stability”); David J. Garrow, 
Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2000) (noting Rutledge’s declining mental health). 
 109. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 71–72. 
 110. Id. at 58–64 (noting the relative ease with which the majority of President Washington’s 
Supreme Court nominees were confirmed, despite them having strong Federalist views). 
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in the confirmation process, but instead provides proponents of both 
the assertive view and the deferential view with arguments to support 
their respective positions.111 Thus, given that proponents of each view 
can make colorable arguments based on the historical record, 
resolving the question of which view is more supported by original 
understanding alone is difficult, if not impossible. 
B. The Senate’s Approach to the Confirmation Process Throughout 
American History 
The history of judicial confirmations shows the use of both the 
assertive and deferential views, and arguments based on historical 
practice reflect the fact that history supports both views. On some 
occasions, the Senate has opposed a nominee for overtly political 
reasons. At other times, it has shown much more deference to the 
president’s nominee. Moreover, the “process has changed much over 
the last two centuries,”112 giving both sides opportunities to make 
historical arguments. As with the debate over original understanding, 
neither the deferential view nor the assertive view has a winning case 
based solely on historical practice. 
1. Nineteenth-Century Confirmations.  The Senate has taken an 
aggressive posture in many confirmation battles, even early in 
American history, and proponents of the assertive view cite these 
battles as support for their position. For instance, in the 1840s, the 
Senate rejected five nominees of President Tyler.113 President 
Cleveland’s Supreme Court nomination of William Hornblower in 
1893 had the same result.114 Such results were not uncommon in the 
nineteenth century, when “the Senate rejected one out of every four 
nominees for the Supreme Court.”115 These partisan rejections, 
however, focused more on the political relationship between the 
president and the Senate than on the ideology of the nominee. 
President Tyler was essentially a president without a party, and many 
 
 111. Compare Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 25 (arguing for what this Note defines as the 
assertive view), with McGinnis, supra note 40 (arguing for what this Note defines as the 
deferential view). Both articles furnish ample historical evidence for their positions. 
 112. Ronald D. Rotunda, Innovations Disguised as Traditions: A Historical Review of the 
Supreme Court Nominations Process, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 123, 123. 
 113. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 85–86. 
 114. Id. at 114–15. 
 115. Gauch, supra note 91, at 337. 
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senators, both Democrats and Whigs, were his political enemies.116 
And the rejection of President Cleveland’s nominee was spearheaded 
by a New York senator who wanted President Cleveland to nominate 
a different New Yorker to the Court.117 
Alternatively, proponents of the deferential view can point to the 
easy confirmation of the majority of nominees with clear ideological 
preferences.118 Furthermore, these proponents can distinguish the 
Senate’s rejection of the nominees of Presidents Tyler and Cleveland 
by noting that the political disputes at issue involved not the 
nominee’s ideology, but rather battles between presidents and 
senators over other political issues.119 Still, these examples undercut 
Senator Graham’s historical arguments because senators during this 
time period were basing their decisions on more than just a 
combination of the nominees’ qualifications and the general 
acceptability of the nominee’s views.120 
2. Early-Twentieth-Century Confirmations.  The judicial 
nominations of the twentieth century also provide support for both 
the deferential view and the assertive view. Proponents of the 
assertive view can point to the Senate’s rejection of John Parker in 
1930. Nominated for the Supreme Court by President Hoover, Parker 
was a judge on the Fourth Circuit who faced bitter opposition from 
the American Federation of Labor and the NAACP.121 Progressives 
attacked Judge Parker’s record, claiming that he was racist and 
hostile to organized labor; Parker was narrowly rejected by a 41 to 39 
vote.122 Proponents of the assertive view claim that the Parker 
nomination process was exactly like Robert Bork’s nomination 
process in 1986, in which Bork’s views were evaluated and eventually 
rejected by senators who disagreed with those views.123 Supporters of 
 
 116. See ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 85–86 (describing the opposition that President 
Tyler’s nominees faced in the Senate because of the Senate’s hostility toward President Tyler). 
 117. See, e.g., id. at 114–15 (describing the animosity between President Cleveland and 
Senator David B. Hill of New York). 
 118. See id. at 102–04 (noting that the Senate approved all of President Grant’s Supreme 
Court nominees by large majorities). 
 119. See Eastman, supra note 21, at 649–51 (discussing the political nature of the 
Jeffersonian Republicans’ efforts to impeach Justice Chase). 
 120. See supra note 46. 
 121. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 32–33. 
 122. WITTES, supra note 7, at 50–53. 
 123. See id. at 51 (noting that the Parker confirmation fight “display[ed] almost all of the 
elements of the later Bork fight”). 
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the assertive view also point to Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation 
hearings as an example of senators’ opposing a nominee based on 
ideology.124 During the Marshall confirmation, Southern senators 
treated Marshall very harshly and voted against him because of his 
race and liberal views.125 
Meanwhile, other nominations during the twentieth century 
support the deferential view. Proponents of this view can point to the 
easy confirmations enjoyed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
record-setting nine Supreme Court nominees, all of whom were 
widely regarded as liberal.126 G. Harold Carswell’s nomination by 
President Nixon in 1970 also provides support for the deferential 
view. Senators worried about the conservative Southerner’s extreme 
views on civil rights.127 Even Carswell’s supporters admitted his 
mediocre ability, which, when combined with his extreme views, led 
the Senate to reject his nomination.128 The Bork nomination can also 
support the deferential view. Although some senators undoubtedly 
opposed Bork’s nomination because they disagreed with his views, his 
nomination also drew opposition from well-respected Republican 
senators, such as Senator Warner of Virginia, who considered Bork’s 
views on constitutional law too extreme.129 According to this view of 
the Bork nomination, the rejection was at least partly the result of 
some senators’ adhering to the deferential view and refusing to 
confirm a nominee with views that were widely considered far more 
conservative than the mainstream of the nominee’s party. 
 
 124. See id. at 73 (discussing the opposition of Southern senators to Marshall’s nomination). 
 125. See ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 230 (noting that all but one of the votes against 
Marshall’s nomination came from senators from the Deep South). 
 126. See id. at 163–87 (discussing President Roosevelt’s Supreme Court nominations). 
 127. See id. at 11 (noting Carswell’s stated commitment to “White Supremacy”). Of course, 
attributing a rejection solely to the deferential view is difficult because senators can vote against 
a nominee under either justification of the assertive view, whereas other senators may vote 
against a nominee based on the deferential view. Nevertheless, at least some senators who voted 
against Carswell, such as Senator Mathias, were adherents of the deferential view. See Mathias, 
supra note 49, at 204 (describing Senator Mathias’s standard for evaluating judicial nominees). 
 128. See Warren Weaver Jr., Carswell Attacked and Defended as Senate Opens Debate on 
Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1970, at 21 (noting that Senator Roman Hruska stated, in 
support of Carswell’s nomination, that “mediocre judges and people and lawyers . . . . are 
entitled to a little representation”). 
 129. See ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 281–83 (discussing the nomination of Robert Bork). 
Although the rejection of the Bork nomination is often thought of as the quintessential example 
of the assertive view in action, the opposition from Republican senators is perhaps more 
illustrative of the deferential view. Senator Warner was an adherent of the deferential view. See 
supra note 48. 
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3. Confirmations in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras.  Since the 
1980s, senators have trended toward the assertive view.130 The 
Clarence Thomas nomination is the iconic example of the assertive 
view’s dominating the debate, as Thomas’s confirmation was a major 
battle between conservatives and liberals.131 Alito, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan all also faced partisan battles during their confirmations.132 
These confirmation battles have also affected circuit court and district 
court nominations. The confirmation rates of nominees for lower 
federal benches have dropped dramatically since 1980.133 
Still, the years of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are not 
lacking in examples of confirmations in which the Senate has 
appeared to adhere to the deferential view. The nominations of 
Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, for 
example, lend support to the deferential view. Each nominee had 
clear ideological views, yet the Senate confirmed all three nominees 
by overwhelming margins.134 Thus, although partisan confirmation 
battles have grown more common since the 1980s, the deferential 
view has not been totally abandoned. 
*          *          * 
The historical record provides support for both the assertive view 
and the deferential view. Although proponents of each view can 
make a strong case based on this record, neither side can make a 
persuasive case because of the counterarguments on the other side.135 
 
 130. See Rotunda, supra note 112, at 130–31 (claiming that by the 1990s the process had 
changed and the Senate had become more assertive in the confirmation process). 
 131. See, e.g., LEWIS L. GOULD, THE MOST EXCLUSIVE CLUB: A HISTORY OF THE 
MODERN UNITED STATES SENATE 296–98 (2005) (discussing the partisanship of the Thomas 
hearings). Although the Thomas nomination could be representative of the deferential view, the 
circus-like atmosphere of the hearings made this nomination more of an example of an assertive 
Senate trying to examine a nominee aggressively. 
 132. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 133. See SARAH A. BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, ADVICE & DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE 
TO SHAPE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 fig.1-1 (2009) (providing a graph with the confirmation 
rates for circuit court and district court judges between 1947 and 2008). 
 134. See ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 278–79, 305–06, 311–12 (discussing the relatively easy 
confirmations of Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer). Although Chief Justice Roberts faced 
some opposition, his confirmation was still relatively easy. See Charles Babington & Peter 
Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at A1 (discussing 
Chief Justice Roberts’s confirmation). 
 135. The Senate’s varied approach to the confirmation of judges demonstrates the influence 
of political cycles on the confirmation process. See Monaghan, supra note 28, at 1208 (“The 
Senate’s actual role in the confirmation process depended upon the shifting balance of political 
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Therefore, the debate over the Senate’s role in the confirmation 
process remains unresolved. Given history’s failure to end the 
discussion, scholars often turn to another ground for deciding what 
the Senate’s role in the confirmation process should be. 
III.  THE VALUES INVOLVED IN THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS 
The arguments focusing on the original understanding of the 
Advice and Consent Clause and historical practice fail to resolve the 
debate over the Senate’s proper role in the confirmation process. 
Thus, the debate often shifts to the question of which view better 
achieves the purposes of Senate confirmation of judicial nominees. 
Scholars have identified certain values that define the battlefield on 
which these debates are held. Among these values are judicial 
independence, judicial accountability, respect for the rule of law, the 
need for talented legal minds to want to become federal judges, and 
social cohesion.136 This Part sets out these values and considers the 
extent to which each view serves them.137 Like the debates over the 
 
power between Congress and the President.”). See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE 
POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON (1997) 
(describing the cyclical pattern of the strength of presidential leadership). Senators are more 
willing to challenge the president when the president is politically weak at the time of a 
nomination, and senators are forced by political reality to defer to a president who is enjoying 
great popularity at the time of a nomination. Still, some senators have stuck to a particular 
approach despite the political climate. For example, despite President Obama’s relatively high 
popularity during the Sotomayor nomination, see Daily Presidential Tracking Poll, RASMUSSEN 
REP. (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/obama_
administration/daily_presidential_tracking_poll, some Republican senators were still eager to 
challenge the president’s nominee, see Meet the Press, supra note 20. Even if political cycles 
explain some of how the Senate has changed over time, these cycles do not truly explain why 
senators adhere to one view rather than the other. 
 136. For a few examples of sources that base their arguments on these values, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, see Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 
95 GEO. L.J. 929, 937 (2007); Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection 
and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 974 (2007); Mathias, supra note 49, at 205; 
Stephen B. Presser, Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the Rule of Law: A Field Guide to the 
Current Political War over the Judiciary, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 433–36 (2008); Carl W. 
Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV. 769, 791–94 (2010); Brent Wible, 
Filibuster vs. Supermajority Rule: From Polarization to a Consensus- and Moderation-Forcing 
Mechanism for Judicial Confirmations, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 923, 935 (2005); and Elena 
Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 939–40 (1995) (book 
review). 
 137. This Part and Part IV focus more on the complete-distinction justification of the 
assertive view because that is the view that is most often invoked by senators. Nevertheless, as 
noted in Part I.A.2, senators also discuss the no-distinction justification to illustrate the 
differences between these justifications. 
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original understanding of advice and consent and historical practice, 
the debates over these values fail to focus on the underlying 
disagreement between proponents of the assertive and deferential 
views. These debates help reveal this underlying disagreement, but 
they focus only on a result of that disagreement. 
A. Judicial Independence 
The independence of the federal judiciary is a feature of 
American constitutionalism that has drawn praise and respect from 
across the political spectrum.138 An independent judiciary is one in 
which judges are free from outside influences, including influence by 
the other branches of government, so that they can make decisions 
based solely on the facts and law in each case.139 The need for judicial 
independence is now widely accepted,140 and it is considered “one of 
this Nation’s outstanding characteristics.”141 Hamilton’s defense of an 
independent judiciary in Federalist No. 78142 remains a leading 
argument on the subject. Hamilton’s two primary reasons for favoring 
an independent judiciary were to ensure the ability of the courts to 
enforce constitutional limitations on the powers of the political 
branches143 and to protect the rights of minorities against tyrannical 
majorities.144 Judicial independence is fostered by the constitutional 
 
 138. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 7879–86 (2005) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.) 
(stressing the need for judicial independence); 149 CONG. REC. 28,857 (2003) (statement of Sen. 
Bill Frist) (“[T]he Senate stewardship of the independent judiciary is perhaps the Senate’s most 
important task.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 466 (“The 
complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited 
Constitution.”). 
 139. Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
315, 320 (1999). 
 140. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) 
(plurality opinion) (“The Federal Judiciary was therefore designed by the Framers to stand 
independent of the Executive and Legislature—to maintain the checks and balances of the 
constitutional structure, and also to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained 
impartial.”); Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970) (“There 
can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to the imperative need for total and absolute 
independence of judges in deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function.”); Burbank, 
supra note 139, at 341 (“It was also [the Framers’] view that judicial independence was 
instrumental to the resolution of ordinary cases according to law.”); Strauss & Sunstein, supra 
note 25, at 1504 (“To be sure, the Supreme Court is supposed to be independent . . . .”). 
 141. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 136 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 143. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 465–66. 
 144. Id. at 470 (noting that only independent courts can protect “particular classes of 
citizens [from] . . . unjust and partial laws”). 
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provisions providing for tenure during good behavior145 and 
prohibiting the reduction of judges’ salaries.146 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has garnered a strong and enduring respect among 
the public, which has come to accept the federal courts’ need for 
independence from the political branches.147 
Judicial independence can exist in two ways: actual 
independence and perceived independence.148 Actual judicial 
independence involves the postconfirmation relationship between the 
courts and the other branches.149 Thus, a judge can be independent 
once confirmed if the Senate does not try to influence the outcomes 
of his cases, regardless of whether confirming senators have 
aggressively inquired into his ideology or deferred to a broad range of 
generally accepted views during his confirmation.150 Perceived judicial 
independence is the public’s perception of whether judges are able to 
make decisions free from the influence of the political branches.151 
The confirmation process can have the most pronounced effect on 
perceived independence. 
 
 145. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, 
shall hold their Offices during good Behavior . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 93, at 470–71 (“That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the 
Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, 
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission.”). 
 146. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, . . . shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 93, at 471 (arguing that the constitutional prohibition on reducing judges’ 
salaries “is the most eligible provision that could have been devised” to protect judicial 
independence). 
 147. See WITTES, supra note 7, at 103–04 (describing how the Court has helped promote its 
independence through means beyond the explicit protections of the judiciary in the 
Constitution). Compare Topics at a Glance: The Supreme Court, ROPER CTR., http://www.
ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/tag/the_supreme_court.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) 
(providing polling data on the public’s opinion of the Supreme Court), with RealClearPolitics 
Poll Averages, REALCLEARPOLITICS, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/polls (last visited Feb. 
14, 2012) (averaging the results of multiple polls on the approval ratings of both President 
Obama and Congress). 
 148. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 279 
(2008) (recognizing the difference between actual and perceived judicial independence). 
 149. See Burbank, supra note 139, at 336 (discussing the role of judicial independence in the 
American constitutional system). 
 150. See Erwin Chemerinksy, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1990 
(1988) (noting that judges should be “insulated” from politics once they are on the bench). 
 151. See O’BRIEN, supra note 27, at 330 (“The Court’s prestige rests on preserving the 
public’s view that justices base their decisions on interpretations of the law, rather than on their 
personal policy preferences.”). 
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For proponents of the complete-distinction justification of the 
assertive view, the clear line between law and politics requires that 
senators inquire into a nominee’s views to ensure that those views 
align with the senators’ own views of the law. Thus, for example, 
Senator Sessions noted that he would inquire into Sotomayor’s 
ideological views to ensure that her views aligned with Senator 
Sessions’s understanding of the law.152 By inquiring into a nominee’s 
views, senators can ensure that judges do not have views that will 
impermissibly influence their decisions and lead to decisions contrary 
to established precedent.153 Although the depth and pointedness of 
senators’ questions associated with this inquiry may cause judges to 
appear less independent,154 the inquiry is necessary to protect the clear 
line between politics and law.155 By having senators inquire into 
nominees’ views, the public can trust that only those nominees who 
will uphold the law will sit on the bench. 
Meanwhile, according to the no-distinction justification of the 
assertive view, senators should intensely scrutinize nominees’ views in 
an attempt to influence the development of the law by voting to 
confirm only nominees who share their ideological views.156 Under 
this justification, the appearance of independence is far less important 
because the law is shaped by the views of those judges who sit on the 
bench and because knowing what nominees believe is essential to 
knowing how they will decide cases. Judges can still have actual 
independence to decide particular cases, but they need not appear 
independent or isolated from the political process because, according 
to this view, the law is not independent or isolated from politics. 
Proponents of the deferential view can argue that their view 
provides a much greater appearance of independence. Although the 
president may choose a nominee based on ideology,157 the president’s 
use of ideology is not as obvious as the Senate’s use of ideology 
because the president does not have to discuss any political 
 
 152. See supra note 15. 
 153. For a discussion of the assertive view’s focus on preventing judges from basing 
decisions on their ideological beliefs rather than the law, see supra notes 20, 23 and 
accompanying text. 
 154. See O’Scannlain, supra note 21, at 174 (claiming that aggressive questioning of judicial 
nominees “threatens to erode” judicial independence). 
 155. See supra notes 20, 32 and accompanying text. 
 156. See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22 (arguing that people are generally aware 
that judges’ decisions are influenced by their personal views). 
 157. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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motivations behind the selection.158 Whereas the assertive view’s use 
of ideology puts the ideological positions of nominees squarely in the 
public eye, the deferential view does not usually emphasize a 
nominee’s specific positions on controversial issues.159 The deferential 
view accepts that some degree of judicial discretion exists due to the 
underdeterminacy of law. It seeks to give judges room to exercise that 
discretion without forcing them to disclose their views on extremely 
controversial issues that would divide the public during the 
confirmation process and will be likely to become the focus of high-
profile cases.160 
B. Judicial Accountability 
Another value reflected in the confirmation process is judicial 
accountability. Because democracy is rooted in the idea that the 
people have the ultimate authority, affording judges lifetime tenure 
can pose serious threats to democratic legitimacy.161 Judicial 
accountability sits in tension with judicial independence because a 
judiciary that must constantly answer to public opinion cannot be 
sufficiently free to make decisions based on law rather than on 
popular opinion.162 At the same time, the public is unlikely to support 
independence for a judiciary that seems completely detached from 
the real world. 
 
 158. For instance, presidents do not have to make the type of statements that senators who 
adhere to the assertive view make during hearings. See, e.g., supra note 15. 
 159. The practical distinction between these views was evident in the different approaches 
to questioning Kagan. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Graham, the Gentleman, at Kagan Hearings, THE 
DAILY BEAST (June 29, 2010, 2:30 PM EDT), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/
2010/06/29/graham-the-gentleman-at-kagan-hearings.html (contrasting Senator Graham, who 
maintained a “good-natured dialogue” with Kagan, with the “other senators of both parties who 
doggedly pressed Kagan to agree with their views”). 
 160. See Bruce Fein, Commentary, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 672, 687 (1989) (arguing that an assertive Senate will weaken the judiciary); Jackson, 
supra note 136, at 982–83 (asserting that some limits constrain the questions that senators are 
willing to ask during confirmation hearings). 
 161. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962) (discussing the countermajoritarian nature of the 
judiciary). 
 162. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Essay, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2171 
(2006) (“While independence frees judges to make unpopular decisions, lack of accountability 
may at the same time free them to make erroneous decisions. However, the more we hold 
judges accountable, whether to the political branches, the public, or both, the less independence 
judges will enjoy.”). 
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The realization that the judiciary is not as weak or as 
uninfluential as it was originally imagined to be163 has given rise to 
serious concerns about how federal judges can be held accountable to 
the public.164 In Federalist No. 79,165 Hamilton argued that 
impeachment would be a sufficient check on judges and would 
provide all the accountability that would be necessary.166 
Impeachment of federal judges, however, has been an infrequent 
occurrence, and now it is invoked only for criminal behavior.167 
Realistically, the best way for the political branches to hold the 
judiciary accountable is through the confirmation process.168 
Both national accountability and local accountability inhere in 
the confirmation process. First, national accountability exists through 
the president.169 As the only nationally elected official, the president 
 
 163. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 465–66 
(claiming that the judiciary “ha[s] neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment” and “is 
beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments”), with O’Scannlain, supra note 21, at 
171–72 (arguing that the judiciary is far more powerful than the Founders believed it would be. 
 164. See BICKEL, supra note 161, at 16–23 (discussing the inherent tension in a democracy 
between the will of the majority and the ability of the unelected judiciary to overrule the 
majority). 
 165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 474 (“[The 
Impeachment Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4,] is the only provision on the point which is 
consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which 
we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.”). 
 167. See Burbank, supra note 139, at 340 (“[T]he impeachment article has become a virtual 
dead letter for [holding judges accountable for their decisions] . . . .”); History of the Federal 
Judiciary: Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (providing a list of the 
fifteen impeached federal judges). 
 168. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–88 (2001) (describing the theory of partisan entrenchment and noting 
that “[federal] judges—and particularly Supreme Court Justices—tend to reflect the vector sum 
of political forces at the time of their confirmation”); O’Scannlain, supra note 21, at 171 (“[T]he 
primary means by which the political branches exert control over an otherwise insulated federal 
judiciary—especially during the last decade and a half—has been the confirmation process.”); 
Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1504 (describing how nomination by the president and 
confirmation by the Senate provide a political check on the federal judiciary). Since George 
Washington’s presidency, presidents have recognized the importance of the power to nominate 
federal judges. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 10 (tracing the history of Supreme Court 
nominations). The nomination process has generally provided meaningful accountability by 
permitting public opinion to influence who sits on the federal bench. See WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 210 (new ed. 2001) (arguing that the confirmation process 
allows “the public will” to shape the federal judiciary). 
 169. Scholars and senators generally agree that the president nominates people for the 
federal bench who substantially share his ideological commitments. Therefore, when voters 
choose one presidential candidate over another, they are by implication favoring one type of 
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selects a nominee whom the president, and presumably many of the 
president’s supporters, believe to be qualified and to possess the 
desired ideological views.170 Thus, presidential nomination provides 
some judicial accountability at the national level. Second, the senators 
who must confirm or reject the nominee each represent the views of 
one of the fifty states, so when senators vote on a nominee, they hold 
the judiciary accountable on a more local level. 
The assertive view and the deferential view provide 
accountability to different degrees and in different ways. The 
assertive view provides a type of double accountability. By 
considering a nominee’s ideological views to the same extent as the 
president, senators provide a second check in the confirmation 
process.171 This check is necessary under both justifications for the 
assertive view. For the complete-distinction justification, exercising 
this second form of accountability is important because it provides 
senators with a chance to ensure that judges base their decisions on 
the law rather than on their own views. For example, senators 
adhering to the assertive view regularly ask nominees about abortion 
because those senators have clear beliefs about what the Constitution 
requires the law on abortion to be.172 This inquiry can help a senator 
know whether a nominee will base decisions on what the law is—or 
on what the senator believes the Constitution requires the law to be—
rather than on what the nominee wants the law to be.173 For the no-
 
judge over another. For detailed explanations of these ideas, see generally ABRAHAM, supra 
note 10, which traces the history of judicial nominations and the criteria used by presidents in 
making those nominations; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, which uses decisions by judges to 
demonstrate a shared ideology with the presidents who nominated them; and Robert A. Dahl, 
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 
279 (1957), which discusses how the Supreme Court reflects popular opinion. 
 170. See supra note 23. 
 171. A potential problem is that, due to the Senate’s structure of equal representation for all 
states, a bloc of senators from small states who object to a nominee’s ideological views could 
thwart the will of the majority of the country. See LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT 
CONSTITUTION: 23 PROPOSALS TO REVITALIZE OUR CONSTITUTION AND MAKE AMERICA A 
FAIRER COUNTRY 25 (2007) (explaining that the Senate’s structure permits a small portion of 
the nation’s population to block the majority’s will). 
 172. See, e.g., Editorial, Judge Alito on Abortion, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2005, at A20 (noting 
the importance to senators of Alito’s views on abortion); Sotomayor Deflects Questions on 
Abortion, MSNBC.COM (July 15, 2009, 7:17 PM ET), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31917681/
ns/politics-supreme_court/t/sotomayor-deflects-questions-abortion (describing Republican 
senators’ questions to Sotomayor on abortion). 
 173. See Emery G. Lee III, The Federalist in an Age of Faction: Rethinking Federalist No. 76 
on the Senate’s Role in the Judicial Confirmations Process, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 235, 238–39 
(2004) (summarizing common arguments in support of the position that the assertive view 
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distinction justification, a focus on the nominee’s ideological views 
provides an opportunity to influence the development of the law. 
Because judges are essentially unaccountable once they are 
confirmed, the confirmation process provides a chance for senators to 
try to keep off the bench those nominees who have views with which 
they strongly disagree.174 
According to proponents of the deferential view, presidential 
nomination of judges provides sufficient accountability in the 
confirmation process because the president represents the entire 
nation.175 Although this form of accountability is not as strong as the 
accountability that the assertive view would provide, adherents of the 
deferential view find their position sufficient because it provides a 
degree of accountability while still allowing enough independence for 
judges to make decisions without appearing to bend to the political 
views of the people who nominated and confirmed them.176 This 
careful balance between accountability and independence is desirable 
to give judges the necessary room to decide cases. The political 
process exerts some influence, but judicial reasoning also plays a role 
in the development of the law. Proponents of this view argue that it 
seeks to maintain a balance between judicial accountability and 
independence that is appropriate in a democracy while 
simultaneously appreciating the underdeterminacy of law.177 
 
provides greater accountability for federal judges because nominees’ ideological commitments 
are tested and can be rejected by the Senate). 
 174. Cf. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Filibustering Judicial 
Nominations, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 337 (2005) (defending the filibuster as a means of 
checking judicial power). 
 175. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 21, at 645 (discussing the president’s power to nominate 
federal judges); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 711 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“[The president] (along with his constitutionally subordinate Vice President) is the only official 
for whom the entire Nation votes, and is the only elected officer to represent the entire Nation 
both domestically and abroad.”); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) (“The 
importance of [the president’s] election and the vital character of its relationship to and effect 
upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too strongly stated.”). 
 176. See Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham, 
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (providing Senator Graham’s evaluation of judicial 
accountability and independence). 
 177. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
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C. Respect for the Rule of Law 
Society’s respect for the rule of law is essential for a nation to 
sustain its democratic structure.178 The rule of law exists when a nation 
is governed by “fixed and publicly known [laws] . . . , so that those 
applying the law, as much as those to whom it is applied, can be 
bound by it.”179 The rule of law embodies values such as consistency, 
stability, predictability, and transparency.180 
As with judicial independence, the fact and the appearance of 
the rule of law are not identical. Although the two often coexist, one 
can exist without the other. Because society’s respect for the rule of 
law can be based only on collective perceptions, the appearance of 
the rule of law is the more important aspect. Society will maintain 
respect for the rule of law if people believe that judges make 
decisions based on promulgated rules and free from political 
considerations, interpreting the law based on an honest legal 
judgment and applying that judgment to the facts of each case. 
Without this understanding, the values embodied in the rule of law 
begin to fade, and their benefits are lost.181 
“[T]he rule of law is not self-sustaining,”182 so political leaders, 
including senators in the process of confirming judges, must be 
careful to ensure that their actions do not undermine the appearance 
of the rule of law. The Constitution provides the process for 
 
 178. See, e.g., LARRY DIAMOND, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD 
FREE SOCIETIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 21 (2008) (“A country cannot be a democracy if 
there is . . . no rule of law.”); Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of 
Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2001) (“The rule of law is a 
cornerstone of contemporary constitutional democracy . . . .”); Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of 
Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 966 (2008) (arguing that the rule of law can only be 
sustained by a culture that values it); cf. ROBERT D. PUTNAM WITH ROBERT LEONARDI & 
RAFFAELLA Y. NANETTI, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN 
ITALY 181–85 (1993) (studying the differences between northern and southern Italy to 
demonstrate that a certain culture is necessary for a democratic society to exist). 
 179. Robert H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997). 
 180. Siegel, supra note 178, at 966–67. For early and influential works describing the need 
for the rule of law, see generally LOCKE, supra note 14; and SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEX, REX 
(1644). 
 181. See Siegel, supra note 178, at 967 (“If members of a political community experienced 
the law as deeply alienating over an extended period of time, they would inevitably feel a 
diminished sense of obligation to obey the law.”). 
 182. Id. at 966. 
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appointing federal judges,183 but the actions and statements of the 
participants in the process shape public perceptions of the rule of law 
and of the federal courts more broadly. Although the growth of legal 
realism shattered any notion that the law is “a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky,”184 cases should, at the very least, appear to 
be decided based on accepted methods of legal reasoning instead of 
the personal preferences of judges.185 Because the judges who apply 
the law and decide cases claim their seats on the bench through the 
confirmation process, the process must promote the legitimacy of 
these judges as fair, impartial adjudicators. 
For the complete-distinction justification of the assertive view, 
respect for the rule of law is maintained when judges make decisions 
based on clearly established rules and without considering their 
personal views. Advocates of this justification are likely to believe 
that the aggressive questioning of nominees during the confirmation 
process will ensure that no judge holds views contrary to the law that 
will influence the judge’s decisions.186 As a result, society will be able 
to respect the rule of law knowing that it is based on established legal 
rules, not on judicial biases. Alternatively, the no-distinction 
justification provides respect for the rule of law by ensuring that 
judges who sit on the bench reflect popular opinion. Presumably, 
judges whose views reflect popular opinion will decide cases 
reflecting that opinion. When decisions reflect popular opinion, the 
public is more likely to respect those decisions and abide by them. 
By contrast, the belief that the law is underdetermined leads 
proponents of the deferential view to argue that respect for the rule 
of law is preserved when judges make decisions based on accepted 
forms of legal reasoning, even if the judges’ own views color their 
analyses to some extent.187 Recognizing that the law is molded by 
 
 183. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The president] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States . . . .”). 
 184. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 185. See Rosenfeld, supra note 178, at 1340 (“[T]he rule of law in the narrow sense appears 
to insure a significant amount of legality and the promotion of legal norms that do not stray too 
far from the well of commonly accepted values.”). 
 186. If judges’ views were to influence their decisions, then judges with views contrary to the 
law would be likely to issue decisions that were not based on the established law. See supra note 
23 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra note 185 and accompanying text; cf. Janet Adamy, Court Strikes at Health 
Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2010, at A1 (emphasizing that a Republican president nominated the 
judge who struck down part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
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society’s experiences and by who sits on the bench, adherents of the 
deferential view seek to promote respect for the rule of law by 
confirming judges with reasonable views. Although the individuals 
confirmed as federal judges are likely to affect the outcomes of cases, 
adherents of the deferential view accept the reality that elections have 
consequences.188 These adherents seek to preserve the distinction 
between law and politics while still accommodating the ways that 
politics influences the law’s development.189 The requirement that 
nominees hold reasonable views ensures that the law will not venture 
outside the mainstream, so that the public will be able to accept and 
respect the law.190 
D. The Need for Qualified Jurists 
Society needs and should want smart, capable judges sitting on 
the federal bench.191 Federal courts handle thousands of cases every 
year,192 deciding important questions that affect the rights of 
individuals and providing answers that set forth many of the rules that 
govern society.193 The power held by federal judges necessitates 
intelligent, fair judges who can discern the law and equities in every 
case and apply the law impartially.194 
 
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.C.), and that a Democratic president had nominated the judges who upheld the Act’s 
constitutionality). 
 188. See Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham, 
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting the Senate’s “obligation to honor . . . [and] respect 
elections” in the confirmation process). 
 189. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 190. No bright line exists between the belief that the law is underdetermined and the belief 
that it is indeterminate; rather, the distinction is a matter of degree. Wherever the distinction 
between these positions falls, the deferential view’s requirement of mainstream nominees 
distinguishes its conception of law and politics from the conception of law and politics 
underlying the no-distinction justification of the assertive view. 
 191. See Siegel, supra note 178, at 980 (noting that federal judges “must not only be good 
citizens and men of education and integrity . . . but must also be statesmen” (quoting ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 
Anchor Books 1969) (1835))). 
 192. See generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf 
(summarizing the caseload of federal courts). 
 193. See generally Wallace Mendelson, The Judge’s Art, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 524 (1961) 
(discussing the nature of a judge’s work). 
 194. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“All judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution and apply the law 
impartially . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 471 
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This need for good judges leads to several conclusions. First, 
America’s best legal minds should be encouraged to sit on the federal 
bench. Lifetime tenure makes the federal bench an appealing job.195 A 
federal judgeship should not be made less appealing because of an 
acrimonious confirmation process.196 Instead, nominees should be able 
to expect a confirmation process that is professional, informative, and 
probative of the nominee in a way that meaningfully determines 
whether the nominee would make a good judge. 
Second, the confirmation process must focus on putting qualified 
individuals on the bench. The Senate should block any judge who 
would fail to meet the expectations for federal judges197 because those 
judges have a lifetime appointment198 and few methods exist to bind 
judges once they are on the bench.199 Thus, the Senate’s examination 
of a nominee’s substantive views should be done in a meaningful and 
informative way. Senators should ask serious questions to learn about 
 
(“[T]here can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify 
them for the stations of judges.”). 
 195. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, 
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”). Judicial salaries, although protected, are 
much lower than what most judges would make in private practice, so the protection of salaries 
is not a great enticement for lawyers to become judges. See, e.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 
YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (2007), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport.pdf (“Our judiciary will not properly serve its 
constitutional role if it is restricted to (1) persons so wealthy that they can afford to be 
indifferent to the level of judicial compensation, or (2) people for whom the judicial salary 
represents a pay increase.”). 
 196. See, e.g., WITTES, supra note 7, at 88 (describing how Miguel Estrada refused to be 
considered for the Supreme Court vacancy created by Justice O’Connor’s retirement because of 
his negative experience as a failed nominee for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit). 
 197. Admittedly, these expectations are difficult to articulate. Perhaps more helpful for 
understanding what makes a good judge is studying what makes a bad judge. See Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 431 (2004) (describing bad judges as those jurists “who 
are incompetent, self-indulgent, abusive, or corrupt”). 
 198. For a discussion of the impeachment of federal judges, see supra notes 167, 195 and 
accompanying text. 
 199. One such approach could be limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts. See U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2 (permitting Congress to make certain exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“[H]aving a right to prescribe, 
Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated 
controversies.”). This approach, however, has its limits. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 
2229, 2240 (2008) (invalidating the provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 
U.S.C.), which suspended habeas corpus). See generally Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and 
Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 
(1975) (describing the challenges of trying to limit the discretion of judges). 
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how a nominee would approach the job of judging and the duty of 
deciding cases.200 Ultimately, the confirmation process can ensure that 
qualified judges are installed if it is fair and not so acrimonious as to 
discourage good nominees from being willing to go through the 
process. 
Under either the complete-distinction justification or the no-
distinction justification, the assertive view is more likely to create an 
acrimonious process. Nevertheless, proponents of both justifications 
are likely to view this cost as necessary. Under the complete-
distinction justification, judges’ views must conform to the law, so 
senators must inquire into a nominee’s views. Under the no-
distinction justification, a senator must inquire into the nominee’s 
views to determine whether the nominee shares the senator’s views. 
The process is likely to be far more hostile when senators aggressively 
question a nominee about the nominee’s views on controversial 
issues, a phenomenon occurs when senators follow either justification 
of the assertive view and focus intensely on the nominee’s ideological 
views.201 A burdensome confirmation process, particularly one that is 
personally wearisome, is likely to drive away some potential 
nominees,202 but for proponents of either justification of the assertive 
view, this cost is necessary. 
Under the deferential view, senators are still free to examine the 
nominee’s ideological views, but doing so is necessary only to ensure 
that the nominee holds reasonable positions and to understand the 
nominee’s views on a judge’s role.203 Still, these questions are likely to 
 
 200. If senators have serious questions about a nominee’s personal conduct or concerns 
about ethics charges against a nominee, they should ask those questions. Senators should not, 
however, trump up charges against a nominee because of ideological opposition, as Senator 
Kennedy was accused of doing against Alito. See Byron York, Alito and the Ted Kennedy 
“Study,” NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 9, 2006, 1:54 PM), http://old.nationalreview.com/york/york
200601091354.asp (decrying as spurious Senator Kennedy’s claims that Alito’s dissents on the 
Third Circuit were hostile to individual rights). 
 201. See, e.g., Senate GOP Questions Sotomayor’s Stances, MSNBC.COM (June 24, 2009, 7:38 
AM ET), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31508311/ns/politics-capitol_hill (discussing Republican 
attacks on Sotomayor). This process can, unsurprisingly, be difficult for a nominee and a 
nominee’s family to bear. See, e.g., CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 
266 (2007) (“I had only one last doubt in my mind [about the confirmation process]: I didn’t 
know how much more of a beating [my wife] and I could take.”); Rotunda, supra note 112, at 
131 (“[S]ome first-class nominees may refuse to be considered because they do not wish to 
endure the gauntlet of being subjected to unfair flyspecking of one’s career.”). 
 202. See supra note 196. 
 203. The proper role of a judge is hard to define. Kagan gave an apt description of the 
judge’s role during her confirmation hearings, explaining that judges should respect the political 
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be far less hostile because a senator need only determine that the 
nominee does not hold extreme views and need not push the nominee 
to agree or disagree with a specific position.204 The process may not be 
easy for nominees under the deferential view, but the it not as 
personally burdensome as proponents of the assertive view might 
make it. 
E. Social Cohesion 
A cohesive society is one in which citizens coexist peaceably 
despite any disagreements they might have on various issues. 
America is a nation of people who hold widely divergent views on 
many issues. In a pluralistic society, citizens must adhere to some 
overarching values that bind them together, no matter their other 
disagreements.205 In the United States, social cohesion is premised on 
a shared reverence for life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the 
equality of all people under the law.206 Although these values are 
broad and somewhat amorphous, they underlie senators’ 
conversations about judicial nominations.207 These values can be 
interpreted in many different ways, but, ultimately, a good 
confirmation process will promote social cohesion by reinforcing 
society’s common bonds rather than sharpening its cleavages. 
By focusing on a nominee’s ideological views, the assertive view 
often highlights the issues that matter most to the public. Senators 
raise the controversial issues that dominate public attention and that 
 
branches, adhere to precedent, and decide cases narrowly. The Nomination of Elena Kagan To 
Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 266 (2010) (statement of Elena Kagan). 
 204. Cf. Fein, supra note 160, at 687 (arguing that an assertive Senate will drive away 
otherwise-qualified nominees). For an explanation of the difference in the tenor of senators’ 
questioning under each view, see supra note 159. 
 205. See Rosenfeld, supra note 178, at 1310 (“[I]n heterogeneous societies with various 
competing conceptions of the good, constitutional democracy and adherence to the rule of law 
may well be indispensable to achieving political cohesion with minimum oppression.”). 
 206. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths 
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”). 
See generally THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 46 (Belknap Press 2010) (1776) (encouraging 
Americans to rally behind a common cause). Of course, scholars can vehemently disagree about 
how these values should shape society. Still, these values provide a foundation for people with 
different ideologies to live amongst each other with a common understanding. 
 207. See, e.g., Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. 
Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (implicating many of these values in discussing 
Senator Graham’s support for Kagan’s nomination). 
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lead to the most divisive cases.208 Under the complete-distinction 
justification, senators ask nominees about their views on these issues 
to determine whether the nominees would decide cases contrary to 
what the senators believe the law is. Thus, this justification promotes 
social cohesion by allowing senators to protect the law from politics 
through a focus on substantive issues. Under the no-distinction 
justification, however, senators ask questions about controversial 
issues because they want to confirm only the nominees with whom 
they agree. Although these issues generate controversy,209 proponents 
of this justification of the assertive view treat the law as another 
means of achieving a certain result, so they have no reason to 
emphasize an empty hope of social cohesion ahead of their policy 
goals.210 
Meanwhile, the deferential view promotes social cohesion by 
deemphasizing society’s sharpest disagreements. By taking a broader 
view of a nominee’s ideology, the deferential view allows the 
confirmation process to underscore the common bonds of Americans 
and the respected role of the federal courts in America’s 
constitutional system. By acknowledging the legitimacy of different 
ideological views during the confirmation process, the deferential 
view promotes unity and a sense of respect.211 It also helps keep the 
confirmation process from becoming a major political battle. In a 
time of great partisanship,212 the deferential view provides an 
opportunity for the Senate to focus on points of agreement and 
 
 208. One such controversial issue is abortion. Senators regularly prod nominees about their 
views on abortion and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra notes 26, 172. 
 209. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act 
Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1 (discussing the controversy surrounding the 
Obama administration’s decision not to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)), in 
court); Jennifer Steinhauer, Under Banner of Fiscal Restraint, Republicans Plan New Abortion 
Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at A18 (describing the controversy over proposed abortion 
restrictions). 
 210. See Gauch, supra note 91, at 364 (“If political dealing is inevitable, we should recognize 
it as such or we will only further obscure the real issues.”). 
 211. Cf. 151 CONG. REC. 7875–76 (2005) (statement of Sen. James M. Talent) (describing 
the “divisive” results when senators attack nominees solely because of ideological 
disagreements). 
 212. See, e.g., Dan Balz, Bayh’s Criticism of Congress: Overstated or Spot-On?, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 17, 2010, at A1 (discussing the partisanship in Congress). 
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provides a refreshing break from its normal political fighting.213 The 
deferential view also seeks to protect democracy, which can become 
fragile if the tensions within a country are too strained. 
IV.  CLARIFYING THE UNDERLYING DEBATE BETWEEN THE 
COMPETING VIEWS OF ADVICE AND CONSENT 
Although the values in Part III often provide the battlefield for 
proponents of the assertive view and the deferential view in the 
debate over the Senate’s role in the confirmation process, discussion 
of these values ultimately does not resolve the question of which 
approach is better. Instead, they only reveal a deeper disagreement 
between proponents of these views. Fundamentally, the assertive 
view and the deferential view face a stark divide in their conceptions 
of the relationship between law and politics. This Part discusses this 
more fundamental disagreement about the confirmation process. This 
disagreement manifests in two ways: in senators’ comments about and 
during judicial confirmations and in commentators’ and scholars’ 
arguments about which approach is better. 
First, senators’ own comments reveal their underlying 
assumptions about the relationship between law and politics. On the 
one hand, Senators Sessions and Leahy and then-Senator Joseph 
Biden have all noted that they would inquire carefully into nominees’ 
ideological views.214 Each senator’s statement suggested that a 
nominee whose political views did not align with accepted law would 
not be fit for the bench because the senators feared that such a 
nominee would decide cases contrary to the law.215 Implicitly, these 
senators were saying that law and politics are separate and that judges 
should never let their political views influence their legal decisions. 
Senator Graham, on the other hand, openly stated his view of the 
relationship between law and politics during the Sotomayor and 
Kagan confirmation hearings.216 Although he recognized that a 
“difference between politics and the law” exists,217 he nevertheless 
 
 213. Cf. Dana Milbank, One of These Senators Is Not Like the Other, WASH. POST, July 21, 
2010, at A2 (claiming that Senator Graham “believe[s] there are bigger things than politics” and 
that he “towers above his Senate Republican colleagues”). 
 214. See supra note 15. 
 215. See supra note 15. 
 216. E.g., Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary); Graham, supra note 18. 
 217. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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admitted that “elections have consequences” for the judiciary and the 
law.218 In these statements, Senator Graham recognized that although 
law and politics are not synonymous, they have an intertwined 
relationship in which political events have repercussions for the law. 
Although senators rarely explicitly challenge each other’s views of the 
relationship between law and politics, these statements from Senators 
Sessions, Leahy, Biden, and Graham reveal deep differences. 
Second, the arguments that proponents of each view put forth as 
to why their view best vindicates the values implicated by the 
confirmation process also reveal these differing views on the 
relationship between law and politics. The emphasis that adherents 
put on certain values instead of other values reflects their views with 
respect to the relationship between law and politics, even if unspoken 
or subconscious. 
For the assertive view, law and politics can be either completely 
distinct or not distinct at all. Either way, senators focus intensely on a 
nominee’s ideological views. Although the justifications of the 
assertive view are at opposite ends of the spectrum in describing the 
relationship between law and politics, they lead to the same 
conclusion as to how the Senate should approach its role in the 
confirmation process.219 This view does not mask differences; it brings 
them to the forefront to expose the consequences of those 
differences. For example, under the assertive view, senators 
emphasize the importance of judicial accountability and the Senate’s 
role as a check on nominees, suggesting that the appearance of 
judicial independence is not as important as holding judges 
accountable.220 Likewise, senators are not as concerned about making 
the process easy for nominees; instead, senators are concerned with 
learning a nominee’s ideological beliefs to ensure those beliefs 
conform to the law.221 And finally, proponents of the complete-
distinction justification claim that the rule of law is best upheld when 
the law is kept separate from politics.222 
By contrast, proponents of the deferential view emphasize the 
need for judicial independence and social cohesion. Because this view 
rests on the underdeterminacy of law, it recognizes the influence of 
 
 218. Graham, supra note 18. 
 219. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 220. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
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both politics and traditional methods of judicial decisionmaking on 
the development of law.223 Adherents of the deferential view 
emphasize these values because giving judges, who tangentially 
reflect public opinion, the freedom to make decisions ensures that the 
law reflects society’s values while still separating the law enough from 
politics to ensure that it will garner respect and be followed.224 Like 
proponents of the assertive view, proponents of the deferential view 
also argue that their approach best protects the rule of law because it 
appreciates the impact of politics on the law without forcing the law 
to fit within a particular political ideology.225 Thus, their arguments 
are premised on the idea that the law and politics are related but not 
inseparable. 
The debate highlighted in Part III could theoretically provide a 
basis for resolving which view is better if senators and scholars could 
agree about the relative importance of each value. In some instances, 
the assertive view better vindicates certain values, whereas in other 
instances, the deferential view does. Even if using these values to 
decide which senatorial role is better were possible, making the 
decision on these terms would be misguided because it would ignore 
the deeper disagreement between the two views. The underlying 
disagreement about the relationship between law and politics leads 
proponents to talk past each other when their debate is based on 
values that they weigh differently. Although they argue over the same 
values implicated in the confirmation process, those values are not 
the only subject of dispute. A more robust—and more useful—debate 
can be had by considering the way each side views the relationship 
between law and politics. 
Of course, even conclusively resolving the debate over the 
relationship between law and politics might not clearly identify the 
Senate’s proper role in the confirmation process. Realistically, 
however, a resolution to the law-and-politics question is not 
possible—or at least it is not probable anytime soon226—so debates 
over the Senate’s role may still turn back to historical practice or 
pragmatic arguments about the values involved in the process. But 
 
 223. See supra note 54. 
 224. See supra notes 57–60, 181, 205 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 226. For an article offering a new theory of the relationship between law and politics and 
describing older theories, see generally Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the 
Relationship Between Law and Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319 (2010). 
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with the model developed in this Note, those debates can now include 
and incorporate the role that the disparate views of the relationship 
between law and politics plays in this disagreement. 
CONCLUSION 
After more than a decade with no Supreme Court nominations, 
five nominations to the Supreme Court were made between 2005 and 
2010, as were many contentious lower court nominations. These 
nominations brought renewed attention to the issue of the Senate’s 
role in judicial confirmations. With no clear original understanding or 
historical practice illuminating the meaning of the Advice and 
Consent Clause, the values implicated in the confirmation process 
often provide the foundation for the debate over which view better 
achieves the purposes of having the Senate involved in the 
confirmation process. These debates, however, only mask an 
underlying, fundamental area of disagreement: the proper 
relationship between law and politics. The arguments made in 
support of each view based on these values reveal divergent 
underlying premises. This Note identifies this underlying 
disagreement so that future discussions of the Senate’s role in the 
confirmation process can focus on this important issue. With a better 
understanding of the underlying debate over the Senate’s role in the 
confirmation process, scholars and senators can now debate the 
Senate’s proper role within a more useful framework. 
